#### DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE: : Case No. 07-11757(KCF)

: Adv. No. 08-01201(KCF)

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SOLOMON DWEK, et al., : Trenton, New Jersey

: November 29, 2011

Debtors : 2:14 P.M.

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CHARLES A. STANZIALE, JR., CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE

ESTATES OF SOLOMON DWEK,

et al.,

Plaintiff,

VS.

. . .

BEAR STEARNS, INC., KENNETH : CAYRE, KLCC INVESTMENTS, LLC, : AND KLC FOUNDATION AND D AND D:

TRUST,

Defendants. :

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHRYN C. FERGUSON
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Audio Operator: Geraldine Holley-Mack

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P.O. BOX 1216

OCEAN GATE, NEW JERSEY 08740-1216

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APPEARANCES:

For the Debtor/:

Plaintiff

Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P. BY: KEVIN D. FINGER, ESQ.

DIANE VUOCOLO, ESQ.
DAVID DeVITO, ESQ.

1001 Market Street -27th Floor

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Philadelphia, PA 19103

For the Defendants:

Cayre

Greenbaum, Rowe,

Smith & Davis, L.L.P.

BY: DARREN C. BARREIRO, ESQ.

99 Wood Avenue South

Iselin, New Jersey 08830

For the Defendants:

Cayre

Seyforth Shaw, L.L.P.

BY: M. RYAN PINKSTON, ESQ. 131 South Dearborn Avenue

Suite 2400

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Colloquy

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THE COURT: Come on forward in Stanziale v 1 2 Bear Sterns. Good afternoon, Counsel. May I have your 3 4 appearances please. 5 MR. PINKSTON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 6 Ryan Pinkston, Seyforth Shaw, on behalf of the Cayre Defendants. 7 8 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't catch your 9 name. 10 MR. PINKSTON: Ryan Pinkston. 11 MR. BARREIRO: Darren Barreiro from Greenbaum 12 Rowe. 13 Mr. Pinkston is here under a pro hac. 14 MR. FINGER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 15 Kevin Finger of Greenberg Traurig along with 16 my colleagues, Diane Vuocolo and David DeVito, on behalf of Plaintiff, Mr. Stanziale. 17 18 THE COURT: Anybody else? Okay. Thank you. 19 This is a motion to -- well, the only one 20 that's contested is the motion to compel discovery 21 responses. Anything to say about the motion to compel compliance with the subpoena or the motion for leave to 22 23 conduct depositions? Anybody have any comment on any of that? 24 25 MR. BARREIRO: I guess the only issue on, on

Colloquy 4

the motion to actually have the deposition happen, we asked for it to happen here in, in the courthouse.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BARREIRO: I think that would be more convenient for all counsel and I put that in the order. If Your Honor doesn't think that's appropriate we can always go down to the penitentiary, but. . .

THE COURT: Actually, I got an <u>ex parte</u> -it's not here. I don't know why. I got an <u>ex parte</u>
letter from Mr. Dwek who says somehow that he's not
represented, which is not my understanding, but that
for security reasons he wants the deposition conducted
in Philadelphia. Does anybody care about that?

MALE VOICE: We'd agree with that, Your Honor.

MR. BARREIRO: We'll go down there.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I don't remember what the order says. Does the order specifically say in the courthouse in Trenton or?

MR. BARREIRO: Mine said that he'll be produced here in Trenton so --

THE COURT: If you could, if you could send in another order that says that he should be produced, and you can make arrangements with the marshals to have the depositions conducted I think in the courthouse in

# Colloquy/Decision/Motion - Finger 5 Philadelphia. 1 2 MR. BARREIRO: In Philadelphia, okay. 3 THE COURT: Okay. And the motion to compel 4 compliance with the subpoena I'm prepared to just grant 5 that unless anybody? 6 MR. BARREIRO: No, that's, that's fine, Your 7 Honor. Thank you. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Great. 9 All right. On the motion to compel discovery 10 responses, I have on the Cayre entities' papers that 11 were filed on November 8th, Mr. Stanziale's certification in opposition filed on November 22nd and 12 13 the Cayre Defendants' reply filed on November 25th. 14 I guess since the Trustee was the last, no, 15 the Cayre Defendants were the last to respond. Why 16 don't you take it from, why don't you take it from 17 there, Mr. Finger. 18 MR. FINGER: I'm sorry, Judge? 19 THE COURT: You can pick up the argument that 20 was left off in the papers. The last papers that I 21 have on this motion were filed by the Cayre Defendants. MR. FINGER: Yes, it's, they filed a reply. 22 23 It's their motion, Your Honor. And the reply doesn't 24 really say anything different than what's in the

original motion for, to compel. There are two basic

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issues or two dividing lines. One pertains to a, to discovery sought on, on pre-petition activities, the actual transfers at issue here versus post petition activities of the Trustee. And with respect to the, the sole item that is pre-petition that has to do with the transfers. It has to do, that request has to do with the Kenneth Cayre's status as an insider.

The Trustee has responded with very lengthy responses and record citations in both the R.33 and R.34 requests and it's, it's just to summarize, the Defendants don't think that's sufficient, or doesn't, it's not sufficient, in their view, to establish that. The proper procedural mechanism, if that's their view, is to file a motion for partial summary judgment on that issue, which they've already done and withdrawn.

So the Trustee's position is we've answered that as, as, in a very fulsome way and stand on those answers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FINGER: With respect to the post petition activity, it's important to, to view the situation from, you know, in the totality of the circumstances. Mr. Stanziale was appointed as trustee for 81 different debtors, 80 of which are entities. And for those post petition activities Mr. Stanziale

has the obligation to investigate all potential causes of action on behalf of, of the estates and bring them accordingly. To date he has done significant activity to bring dollars into the estate. This adversary proceeding is simply one of the causes of action initiated by Mr. Stanziale in his role as trustee. The, so the, what, this set of discovery requests have absolutely nothing to do with the transfers at issue, and, and to that end the Trustee has produced all documents that it has.

In order to do these, to do his job, Mr.

Stanziale has, has, had to do a few things. One is there's one human being who, who, who has knowledge regarding the 80 entities that are debtors in this case, and that's Mr. Dwek, who has, has indeed provided information to Mr. Stanziale and his counsel for not only this cause of action but everything else that the Trustee has done.

In addition, prior to the bankruptcy petitions being filed, the FDA, FBI raided several facilities and, and confiscated all the documents and the Trustee has gone to the FBI data base, they've made it available to him, and, and pulled out the documents that relate to the duties that he has been charged by this Court to discharge. To the extent that those

documents relate in any way to this adversary proceeding, they've been obtained by the Trustee from the FBI and turned over. So as part of, of the Trustee's duties in dealing with Mr. Dwek, who has the knowledge, he's also had some tangential interaction with the U.S. Attorney's office and the FBI largely through ministerial types of things. Doesn't have any FBI memorandum of interview for example. It doesn't have any recordings that were made by the FBI, that sort of thing. So against the Defendants' motion to compel that is how the Trustee has gotten his information.

The Trustee has, has, maintains the privilege of the Debtors that were pre-petition, but also has a privilege post petition regarding his investigation of all the causes of actions that, that are necessary in order to administer the estate including this one. In this way it's very similar to the Worldwide case that comes from the District of South Carolina, Bankruptcy Court in the District of South Carolina, because in that case the former manager, for lack of a better term, of the Debtors was, there were communications between the Trustee and, and her counsel in order to formulate causes of action.

In a very similar way, the Trustee and his

counsel in this case communicated with Mr. Dwek, who is a former agent of the Debtors, but of those 80 debtor entities Mr. Dwek was the person who had the personal knowledge and was among the people that the Trustee dealt with. In, in that context, just as it was in Worldwide, a privilege, a privilege applies.

THE COURT: Well without reference to

Worldwide because I've read that case, what is it that
makes Mr. Dwek more than a really important witness?

What converts him into a client worthy of the attorney/
client privilege or in need of it?

MR. FINGER: Well, what <u>Worldwide</u> does is it applies --

THE COURT: I asked you not reference Worldwide.

MR. FINGER: I understand. Okay.

There are, there are several precedents established by the Supreme Court that govern this. It includes the Weintraub case, the Upjohn case, Hickman case. All of these cases promulgated by the Supreme Court establish an attorney/client privilege on behalf of the corporation and then in those cases discuss the realities of dealing with a corporation. It's an inanimate object.

So in this case what, what there is is,

there's a former agent, that's Mr. Dwek, who represents those 80 entities, and that is the person that the Trustee and his counsel communicated with in order to gather the facts in this case, and that is the basis on which the privilege is claimed. So yes, Mr. Dwek is also an important witness, but he's also the representative of those debtor entities, and that's where the privilege is established, and it's nothing more than an application of established Supreme Court precedent about those privileges.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FINGER: The other, there are a number of items that, that, that Defendants ask for and many of them have to deal with communications between Mr. Dwek and, and the Trustee and his counsel. The vast overwhelming majority of those communications have nothing to do with this adversary proceeding. They, they have to do with the administration of all the other entities that are the subject of these bankruptcy estates. Those that do though are subject to that claim of privilege, but most of them are, are not relevant to this case.

Another, another example is a request for all recordings that were made. Well, there are 81 Section 341 meetings in which recordings were made. Those

## Motion - Finger/Response - Pinkston 11 don't have anything to do with this adversary 1 2 proceeding. So that's another example of the 3 overbreadth of those requests. 4 There are also requests that have to do, to 5 deal with payments that were made to Mr. Dwek and those 6 were made pursuant to an order by this Court and the 7 proper method to challenge that is, is by R.60 or some 8 other established rule of procedure that addresses 9 those types of issues that are already subject to a 10 court order. It's not in the context of this adversary proceeding and, moreover, nothing about those payments 11 12 has anything to do with this adversary proceeding. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. 14 MR. FINGER: Any questions from the Court 15 that I may address? 16 THE COURT: Not right now. Thank you. 17 MR. FINGER: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Pinkston. 18 19 MR. PINKSTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 I have a lot to say and I'll, I'll try not to 21 repeat what's in the papers. 22 I'll pick up on Mr. Finger's last point 23 As far as with relevance in this proceeding, 24 first of all, it's beyond the Trustee's province to 25 decide what's relevant to a trial of these issues, and

even beyond that point credibility, as the authorities set out in our reply, make clear it is always relevant. And I don't, I don't know how otherwise to respond to a statement that a witness being paid over \$1 million by the Plaintiffs in this action is not relevant to an issue of credibility, both to the Trustees credibility and to Mr. Dwek's credibility.

The fact that those payments were made subject to this Court's order and that the Court authorized those payments to be made says nothing about the nature of the expense reimbursement; the types of charges and receipts that Mr. Dwek was submitting; the Trustee's due diligence in review of those receipts; his decision to compensate Mr. Dwek for those. Your Honor already found earlier in the bankruptcy case that some of those payments shouldn't have been made, to the tune of \$150,000. We're entitled to investigate those payments and the Trustee's review of those receipts and the types of charges that Mr. Dwek was submitting. He's a confessed liar and a confessed thief who we believe has parlayed this bankruptcy case into a perpetual income stream.

Those are facts that the jury is entitled to hear and that we're entitled to present to a jury. So we're, we're not seeking to vacate your compensation.

So <u>R.</u>60, <u>R.</u>59 really have nothing to do with this inquiry. This goes to the heart of the Trustee's sole witness in this proceeding. We, we don't doubt that the Trustee needed to communicate with Mr. Dwek to do his job, but to do our job we're entitled to investigate those communications. He's not, he's not Mr. Stanziale's client. He's not Mr. Voucolo's client. And this case is, is vastly different from the Worldwide Lumber case.

In that instance you have a manager of a corporate debtor who is speaking to Trustee's counsel not the Trustee, and the Court basically makes the finding that, that as a co, as co under Weintraub by which the Trustee succeeds to management of the Debtor, Mr. Stadelman in that case is essentially a co-manager. And so if the Trustee's communication with this counsel are privileged why wouldn't Stadelman's communications be privileged.

That's not the case here, Your Honor, for, for a couple reasons. In <u>Worldwide Lumber</u> you had a legitimate corporate entity. Here, all of the corporate entities were a sham. They were set up to perpetuate Mr. Dwek's fraud. The Court already made a finding on that issue when they substantively, when, when Your Honor substantively consolidated the estates.

They are Mr. Dwek's alter egos. That's a prerequisite to finding substantive consolidation. So we don't have the corporate debtor here.

We don't have, we don't have the situation that we had in <u>Worldwide Lumber</u>. And more importantly, <u>Weintraub</u>, <u>Upjohn</u> and <u>Hickman</u> do not stand for the proposition that the Trustee's communications with the Debtor are privileged. What they say is, "A trustee succeeds to the debtor's privilege for pre-petition communications."

I'm sure as the Court knows, Mr. Stanziale can waive Mr. Dwek's -- or maybe not Mr. Dwek's privilege, a trustee can waive a legitimate corporate debtor's privilege if he needs to in the investigation and prosecution of avoidance claims and things of that nature. And the whole basis for that rule is to prevent corporate from, officers of a corporation from using attorney/client privilege to shield their prepetition illegal activity. That's the whole basis of, of the doctrine. So the trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can waive that privilege to pursue those types of claims.

Here, we're not seeking pre-petition communications between Mr. Dwek and his counsel. We're entitled to know what evidence the Trustee held on the

date he filed the complaint and what he's compiled thereafter. And those documents and those communications between the Trustee and his counsel on the one hand and Mr. Dwek and Mr. Dwek's professionals on the other hand are undoubtedly relevant and undoubtedly not privileged.

There cannot be an attorney/client privilege here. The bankruptcy code forbids it. Mr. Stanziale has to be a disinterested person in order to be employed, to be appointed as a trustee. The U.S. Trustee appointed him under that provision. I believe it's Section 1104 of the bankruptcy code. Ms. Voucolo and her, her counsel, and her colleagues have the same obligation to be a disinterested person.

So we, we have a lengthy bankruptcy case here that's gone on for a number of years where the Trustee's representing to the world that he's disinterested and he's performing his duties under that guise and now he comes forward and says, "I'm not actually disinterested because this is my client. Now, I have a privilege." He changes, he changes his, he changes his, his approach when it suits him. And that's not, that's not a legitimate basis for finding attorney/client privilege.

You know, and a finding like that from Your

Honor will have implications for, for future cases.

You'll have every trustee that stands before Your Honor claiming that their communications with the Debtor are privileged. And there's, there's simply no basis in the law for it.

I'd like to address the insider issue, if I can. The, the fact that we are unsatisfied with the Trustee's evidentiary basis for his, his insider claims at this point is a legitimate basis for summary judgment. And we filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue and the Trustee opposed it with two statements. First, the Trustee told us that he needed discovery in order to investigate the claims further. And second, for the first time, Mr. Dwek comes forward and submits an affidavit to the Court accusing our clients of money laundering, for the first time. That's two years after the case started. No one had heard of this money laundering accusation until mid-October of 2010.

The, the timing is suspicious. It comes shortly after we file a motion to limit discovery and, and Mr. Dwek catches wind of our pleading. You know, maybe in a communication between Mr. Dwek and the Trustee, and then all of a sudden there's an affidavit and, and gratuitous testimony in a proceeding before

Judge Linares of the district court about how, how there was this scheme between Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Geary and Mr. Dwek many years before any of these prepetition transfers took place about money laundering.

Mr. Rosenberg has come forward and said he doesn't know Mr. Geary. He's never met or spoken with him. He was here last week and told you, by counsel told Your Honor that. And Your Honor's, Your Honor's made a finding in your opinion cited in our brief, <a href="Stanziale v Levi">Stanziale v Levi</a>, that Mr. Dwek signed an, or verified a complaint and then virtually negated every single one of those verified allegations in deposition testimony.

So we, we think we're entitled to that discovery about the origin of that affidavit, who drafted it, the communications that went on around its drafting, and the provenance of that document, and to test those allegations. It's, it's beyond me to think that that's, that Mr. Dwek's credibility in a case like this where we have a down investor who invested, who lost \$9 million and is being pursued by the Trustee as if he received \$30 million. We think we're entitled to that investigation.

And let me say also while I'm on this topic, this is not a situation where Mr. Cayre received \$30 million. He received a payment. He invested more. He

received a payment. He reinvested the principal. This is not the \$30 million honeypot that the Trustee portrays it to be.

There are a lot of, lot of other issues that are going to be relevant at trial, Your Honor. When Mr. Dwek was arrested for car theft in Maryland and remanded, when his bail was revoked and he was remanded to custody, the Trustee sent a letter to Judge Linares on his behalf. The letter wasn't made of record.

We've been unable to obtain it from, from Judge
Linares. But the Trustee conspicuously hasn't provided it. It's, it's undoubtedly relevant to the Trustee's and Mr. Dwek's credibility.

Additionally, after Mr. Dwek was arrested, we have reason to believe that the Trustee's, the Trustee and his colleagues at McCarter & English were calling around trying to find criminal counsel to represent Dwek in connection with that matter. I, it doesn't make sense that an party to a lawsuit calling and trying to find criminal counsel for one of their witnesses is not relevant or it doesn't have any bearing on the proceeding. Those are facts that the jury is entitled to learn when they weigh the evidence in this case. So we, we think the insider allegations are so scant, Your Honor, that we'd actually ask that

this Court intervene and that the Trustee bring in just, just ten, the ten hottest documents and bring them into the Court and let Your Honor review then, and then we can have a serious discussion about, about the nature of the Trustee's allegations and whether he has a legitimate basis to back up his accusations of money laundering.

Mr. Dwek accused my clients of money laundering. The Trustee's has gone one step further in his latest pleading and actually accused my colleague, an attorney at my firm, of money laundering. That's something that not even Dwek was, was willing to say. They said he was a co-facilitator. We think that really means co-conspirator, but they're, they're wordsmithing so, so they're not actually accusing someone of criminal wrongdoing. It's inappropriate and without, without an investigation, without evidence to back it up that is not something that should ever be put in a pleading and brought before this Court.

On, on the, on the point of Mr. Dwek's credibility, I mentioned that Mr. Rosenberg has come forward and disputed what Mr. Dwek put in his affidavit. I noted Your Honor's decision in which you found that Mr. Dwek negated virtually every verified allegation in the complaint. We suspect, and we

suspect that there are more instances where Mr. Dwek has lied or misled the Trustee. And those go to the, the heart of not only his character but to the heart of the strength and the merit of the Trustee's allegations in this case. We're entitled to, to look at those communications and those documents to, and compare that to what's on record or what was testified at the 81 Section 341 meetings to see ways in which Mr. Dwek has misled or lied to the Trustee in other instances and what the Trustee's response to that was.

It, it can't be the case that the Trustee in his investigation learns that Mr. Dwek is repeatedly lying to him and does nothing about it and that doesn't have some bearing on Mr. Dwek's truthfulness or the Trustee's credibility when they testified to a jury in this case.

Unless Your Honor has a question I think that's all I have.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

MR. PINKSTON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Finger?

MR. FINGER: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

The Defendants have asked for very particular grounds for relief, okay, and I would ask the Court to hold them to that. These other things that Mr.

Pinkston brought up today for the first time that I've heard of about some letter to Judge Linares or some other calling around for counsel is, for all I know it's fabricated. But it's not necessarily implicated in the grounds for relief that, that are the subject of this motion. So there are some other inaccuracies too, that I need to correct.

It is beyond dispute Mr. Dwek is not the Trustee's client. That is not the basis for, for the establishment of an attorney/client privilege. He is the former agent of 80 debtor entities that are the subject of these bankruptcy estates that the Trustee is administering, and that's the basis for that, for that. It's not, it is not the basis of a relationship where Solomon Dwek, an individual, is a client and Mr. Stanziale is a lawyer.

Also, the issue about Mr. Rosenberg stating that he doesn't know Mr. Cayre, there are documents in this production, indeed they're cited in the response to the discovery requests about the insider status, that are letters from Mr. Rosenberg to Mr. Cayre. So that is demonstrably false by the evidence that are in the Trustee's production. Those same documents are the ones that Mr. Pinkston doesn't need the Court to do anything.

In response 17 he's got all the documents that relate to this. Never mind the fact that Mr. Dwek is married to a woman who's aunt is Mr. Cayre's wife. And that's just an undisputed fact. We can argue the legal ramifications of that relationship, but that is nonetheless a fact. These -- so the Court need not intervene with respect to insider sales because those documents are, have been produced and are cited in the record.

And finally, Your Honor, the talk of Mr.

Dwek's credibility certainly that's going to be at issue here, but the fact of certain expenses being paid have nothing to do with his credibility here. In reality, this case rises and falls on the documents that are created. And frankly, Mr. Cayre's explanation for those documents, if and when he ever gets in the witness chair, and this, this discovery (indiscernible) really is simply delaying the, the inevitable, which is depositions in this case, which are going to illuminate a lot of these issues. And, and frankly, from the Trustee's perspective, the sooner we get to that the better off everyone is in terms of prosecuting this case.

Unless there are questions.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

MR. PINKSTON: Just a, just a few follow-ups, Your Honor.

I'd like to direct Your Honor to page 16 of, carries memorandum of law for a discussion about Dwek's, a request the Trustee immediately produce all communications and documentation regarding Dwek's recent arrest; revocation of Dwek's bail in connection with his alleged theft of a car; lying to the FBI and filing a false affidavit; the Trustee's letter to Judge Linares of the district court regarding the foregoing; and, the Trustee's and/or his professionals recent efforts to secure a criminal defense counsel for Dwek. So to say that we haven't asked for those things that are now before the Court is absurd, Your Honor, page 16 of the memorandum of law.

The next, the next point I want to make, Your Honor, is that we have reason to believe, and we cited it in our briefing on this issue that Mr. Stanziale has, has informed the FBI that he thinks Dwek is a pathological liar. I, I can't think of anything else that's more relevant than a plaintiff calling his star witness a pathological liar. That's something the jury is entitled to hear and something we plan to, to present to the jury at trial. Note in the Trustee's response he, he coyly responds that he has no document

reflecting such communications. He doesn't deny that he made the statement. And he can answer, he can answer those questions.

We believe, or we have reason to believe that there are gonna be other instances where the Trustee questioned Dwek's credibility in his communications with the Debtor. For example, Mr., Mr. Dwek submits an expense receipt and the Trustee sends back an E-mail that says, you know, these are hypothetical, Your Honor, it says, "This charge doesn't look right. I'm not exactly sure," and then come to find out it wasn't a legitimate charge. That's something that bears on both men's credibility and it's something that there's no reason to exclude it in discovery.

Maybe, maybe it is or isn't relevant at trial. Maybe it is or is not admissible and something that the jury gets to hear, but that's not Your Honor's, that's not the question before Your Honor today. The question is: Are we entitled to those communications?

There's, there's no reason, there's no basis in law to find that an attorney/client privilege exists here. We can say that Mr., Mr. Dwek was the agent of the corporation, but we all know that's not true. He wasn't operating legitimate businesses. In fact, the

Trustee has already conceded that these were all Mr. Dwek's alter egos when he substantively consolidated the estates before your court. Now, he wants to take the other position these were all different businesses, none of it has anything to do with this case. Your Honor, it's simply, it's, it's too convenient to the Trustee's case to hold water.

THE COURT: Anything else? Thank you.

MR. FINGER: Your Honor, (indiscernible) these were real entities with real assets that have produced real sales (indiscernible). So these (indiscernible) entities are not (indiscernible) somehow fictional is simply false. That there are, they are entities that held assets (indiscernible) dealt with and dealt with his former agent on that.

THE COURT: Okay. Defendants Ken Cayre, KLCC Investments, LLC and KLC Foundation are moving to compel the Trustee to respond to their discovery requests. The Trustee filed certifications and a brief in opposition on November 22nd and the Cayre Defendants filed a response on November 25th.

The Court will first address the threshold issue of relevancy. R.26(b)(1) provides that,

"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to

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any party's claim or defense."

Courts have noted that,

"The precise boundaries of the <u>R.</u>26 relevance standard depend upon the context of each particular action and determination of relevance is within the Court's discretion."

That's from <u>Graco v PMC Global</u>, 2011 W.L.

1114233.

The context of this particular action is crucial to the determination of relevance. The Trustee has admitted that in deciding to file this and other adversary complaints he relied heavily on information obtained from Solomon Dwek. The Trustee has stated numerous times that such reliance was necessary because much of the Debtor's financial information was not written down.

In opposition to this motion the Trustee states that,

"Unraveling this colossal mess necessarily required the assistance its chief creator, Solomon Dwek."

This was the rationale proffered to the Court to justify paying Mr. Dwek with estate funds.

So given that background it is difficult for the Court to understand the Trustee's argument that

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communications between Solomon Dwek and the Trustee and his professionals are not relevant. The Court is well aware that this is only one of hundreds of adversary complaints that were filed in these bankruptcy cases and that many of the E-mails will relate to general administrative matters as well; but, that does not mean that all communications should be shielded from discovery. And contrary to the Trustee's position, post petition communications are also relevant.

The Trustee's decision to file this adversary complaint, his decision to oppose summary judgment and to continue to litigate this case are all based, at least in part, on information being fed to him from Solomon Dwek. That makes these post petition communications relevant. And it makes the statement that the case will rise or fall on the documents seem almost incomprehensible in the context of positions the Trustee has taken throughout the case.

"It needs to be borne in mind that courts have construed R.26 liberally creating a broad range for discovery which would encompass any matter that bears on or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case."

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And that's from <u>Jones v DeRosa</u>, 238 F.R.D.

The requested information certainly meets that liberal standard. The Court also wants to note that how broadly or narrowly the Trustee construes the discovery rules changes as suits him. Just last week the Trustee's counsel was arguing that requesting 15 years worth of discovery from a non-party, that is Chasky Rosenberg, was defensible. When wearing that hat, the Trustee's counsel stated,

"Given the broad scope of the discovery rules the Trustee respectfully submits that at this stage tangential evidence relevance is all that is required."

See <u>Hite v Peters</u>, 2009 W.L. 1748860, which holds that,

"Relevancy is more broadly and liberally construed at the discovery stage than at trial."

Well, the same is true now that the Trustee is on the other side of a motion to compel.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the requested information meets the relevance threshold.

The next issue is whether even if relevant the information should be shielded from disclosure

Decision 29

based on attorney/client privilege or the work product doctrine. The Court is amazed that the Trustee can make this argument with a straight face. Throughout this bankruptcy case Solomon Dwek has been represented by Tim Neumann. At no point prior to this motion has there been any suggestion that Charles Stanziale represented Solomon Dwek. It would seem fairly obvious that such representation would violate the rules of professional conduct because the interests of the estate are frequently at direct odds with the interests of Mr. Dwek.

That issue was explored by the bankruptcy court in <a href="In Re">In Re</a>: Swanland, LLC, 2007 W.L. 4146680, which explained,

"The role of a Chapter 11 trustee is to act as a representative of the debtor's bankruptcy estate not as representative of the debtor. Any attorney for the trustee that might be appointed in these cases would represent the trustee and would not represent the debtors. The fact that a debtor-in-possession performs the duties of a trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1107(a) and 1108 means little in the case of appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee where the debtor-in-

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possession has not been properly performing those duties and is thus relieved of them. "When a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed the trustee and the debtor are not the same party, nor do they necessarily share the same interests. In fact, the interests of a Chapter 11 trustee and debtors are often in opposition. In such a case, if a conflict were to arise, the appointed Chapter 11 trustee's loyalties are to the estate even if they are in direct conflict with the wishes of the debtor further establishing the need for a separate counsel for the debtors." And that's all a quote from that case. That's a clear, that clear distinction

between the role of the trustee and the role of the debtor is not obviated in this case because Mr.

Stanziale felt he needed Solomon Dwek's assistance.

The bankruptcy code itself provides at Section 521(3) that,

"If a trustee is serving in the case the debtor shall cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title."

The cases that the Trustee cites in support

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of the notion that he may assert the attorney/client privilege are thoroughly unpersuasive. The Trustee cites to Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, in which the Supreme Court held that,

"A corporate debtor's attorney/client privilege with respect to pre-petition communication vests in the trustee upon his appointment."

But that is a vastly different issue than whether the post petition communications Charles
Stanziale and his professionals had with Solomon Dwek are protected by the attorney/client privilege.

The primary case relied upon by the Trustee is <u>Vieira v AGM II, L.L.C.</u>, or <u>In Re: Worldwide</u>

<u>Wholesale Lumber</u>, 392 B.R. 197. The <u>Vieira</u> court found that,

"A trustee's right to assert the attorney/client privilege as to post petition communications is a logical extension of the Supreme Court's holding in Weintraub."

The Court fails to see that logic.

"The pre-petition privilege is an asset of the estate so that it makes sense that it should be under the control of the Trustee.

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But post petition communications should follow the normal rules of privilege, and chief among them is that the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client."

And you can see <u>Vermoni v Novanet Health</u>,
259 F.3d 284.

It is that very basic piece that's missing here. Also, even if this Court agreed with the reasoning in <u>Vieira</u> its holding is much more limited than the Trustee suggests. In a footnote the <u>Vieira</u> court states,

"The communications between Stadleman and counsel for the Trustee regarding Stadleman's post petition conduct and knowledge he acquired when he was no longer acting in the capacity of officer or director of the debtor would not appear to be covered by the attorney/client privilege."

And that's from the <u>Vieira</u> case at page 203 at note 6.

Here, the Debtor stopped acting in the capacity of an officer or director of any of the corporate debtors when the Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed. So virtually all of the communications at

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issue here would not be covered by the attorney/client privilege. The Trustee's attempt to shield this information on the basis of attorney/client privilege is baseless. Mr. Dwek is a witness. He is not a client. He is not an agent. The Trustee's client is the estate.

The motion is granted. The Court finds that the information sought is relevant and that the attorney/client privilege and work product doctrine do not shield from disclosure communications between the Trustee and his professionals and Mr. Dwek and his professionals.

Thank you, Counsel.

MR. BARREIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. PINKSTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BARREIRO: One matter of housekeeping,
Your Honor. We have a December 1st discovery end. I
know that we're going to be getting all these documents
and we had submitted a letter asking for an extension
of that jointly through the end of March I thought. We
have a conference December 20th I think --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BARREIRO: -- where Your Honor's clerk indicated we'd be talking about. But given that we're going to be getting these documents and then there's

Decision 34 some more motions I think on the next calendar we were 1 2 hoping to do depositions in this case end of January, 3 February and March. But if we have this December 1st 4 deadline we're sort of all in a pickle. So I wanted to 5 bring that --6 THE COURT: We're not going to extend this 7 till March. 8 MR. BARREIRO: Okay. 9 THE COURT: This case has been going on for a 10 long, long time. I mean obviously, I'm not going to 11 hold anybody to a December 1st deadline, but you need 12 to reset your sights. 13 MR. BARREIRO: Okay. 14 THE COURT: Can I help you? Did you have 15 anything to add? 16 MR. FINGER: No, Your Honor. We had submitted the letter that, that was referred to so. 17 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. We'll have a 19 further discussion on the 20th, but I want you to think 20 a little bit more conservatively about what kind of, 21 what kind of extension I'm going to be willing to grant. Okay. 22 23 MR. BARREIRO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 24 MR. FINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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(Recording off 2:53:52 - on at 2:53:56)

MR. FINGER: Is the Court going to enter the order or is it going to be circulated and submitted to the Court?

THE COURT: We, we got an order from you, didn't we?

MR. FINGER: We, we did submit an order.

THE COURT: I think we'll probably just enter that order.

MR. FINGER: May I ask the Court's indulgence of forestalling the entry of that order pending a decision whether to, to appeal the bases because it's an issue of privilege. It involves, it is the basis for an interlocutory appeal. And I don't, I'm not telling the Court that I'm going to file a Notice of Appeal, but --

THE COURT: You can file it or not, but you have 14 days. Why do I -- from the entry of the order. Why would I delay the entry of the order just so that you can consider an appeal?

MR. FINGER: I don't want to be in that period of time held in contempt of an order that says any --

THE COURT: Okay. I will assure you I will not hold you in contempt of that order during the

1 appeal period.

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2 MR. FINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Adjourned 2:54 p.m.)

### I N D E X

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Motion by Mr. Finger 5

Response by Mr. Pinkston 11/23

Response by Mr. Finger 20/25

The Court: Decision 5/25

### CERTIFICATION:

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

## /s/Isabel E. Cole

Isabel E. Cole

COLE TRANSCRIPTION, L.L.C.

Dated: December 1, 2011